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ABSTRACT 
We introduce a new way to perform network analysis on critical infrastructure 
that is superior to Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection 
(RAMCAP), currently used by the Department of Homeland Security.  We introduce the 
idea of a Design-Attack-Defend model that determines the optimal defense plan for a 
critical infrastructure network within a specified budget constraint.  Design-Attack-
Defend first determines worst-case attacks and then determines where to defend or build 
additional infrastructure that will maximize the surviving efficiency of the infrastructure 
after a malicious attack or natural disaster.  Design-Attack-Defend ensures that the 
defense plan suggested is optimal to a range of attacks, out of all possible defense plans, 
within budget constraints.  The Design-Attack-Defend will always give a solution at least 
as good as RAMCAP and as a simpler, bi-level Attacker-Defender model—and in many 
cases it can be expected to suggest a better plan for where to defend or build additional 
critical infrastructure.  We demonstrate with a model of the Western U.S. railroad 
network. 
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We introduce a Design-Attack-Defend (DAD) algorithm for critical infrastructure 
vulnerability analysis.  We compare three approaches to network analysis: the Risk and 
Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) method used by the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), a bi-level Attacker-Defender algorithm, and tri-level Design-
Attack-Defend.  We simulate an attack on the U.S. West coast commercial rail system 
and calculate the resilience of the rail system after the attack using each of these 
assessment methods.  We show that RAMCAP does not yield an optimal defense plan 
within a given budget constraint and that the Design-Attack-Defend model is a much 
more effective model to use when performing network analysis to determine where to 
defend infrastructure.  In addition, the Design-Attack-Defend model always gives a 
defense plan at least as good as that of bi-level Attacker-Defender, and as the number of 
attacks and defenses increases, tri-level Design-Attack-Defend yields a significantly 
better defense plan than either RAMCAP or Attacker-Defender. 
Design-Attack-Defend (DAD) finds the optimal defense plan for a critical 
infrastructure network using integer linear programming.  DAD first finds the optimal 
attack using a bi-level Attacker-Defender algorithm.  DAD then defends against that 
attack.  DAD continues to iterate between designing affordable infrastructure 
enhancements, and attacking the network with the enhancements, eventually leading to 
an optimal defense strategy:  The defense plan that DAD yields is an optimal defense 
plan within given budget constraints. 
Design-Attack-Defend gives better advice than RAMCAP because RAMCAP 
performs no analysis of network performance following an attack or natural disaster.  
RAMCAP bases it defense plan solely on the flow of goods prior to an attack or natural 
disaster.  Design-Attack-Defend performs better than bi-level Attacker-Defender because 
Attacker-Defender only looks at the worst-case attack and defends against that attack for 
a given, fixed infrastructure.   
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Since 9/11, federal, state, and local governments have been concerned with 
protecting our critical national infrastructure.  The Presidential National Strategy for 
Homeland Security says:  
We cannot simply rely on defensive approaches and well-planned 
response and recovery measures.  We will disrupt the enemy’s plans and 
diminish the impact of future disasters through measures that enhance the 
resilience of our economy and critical infrastructure before an incident 
occurs. (White House, 2007) 
Critical infrastructure includes “telecommunications, energy, banking and 
finance, transportation, water systems and emergency services” (PDD-63, 1998).  The 
White House directive mandates that the federal government take steps to improve the 
resilience in our national infrastructure, where resilience is defined as, “The ability to 
reduce the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events.  It is the ability to anticipate, 
absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive event” (NIAC, 
2009). 
Currently, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) guidance (NIPP, 2009) 
suggests the use of risk-based models for analyzing and remediating vulnerabilities in 
infrastructure systems, but such methods use simplistic assumptions that can result in 
ineffective defense plans.  These models use Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) that 
calculates risk by using the equation Risk=Vulnerability*Threat*Consequence, and then 
ranks the components of the critical infrastructure by their calculated risk.  These models 
assume that reducing the individual risk of each component in the system brings down 
overall “system risk.”  This simple analysis ignores the interactions between components 
in complex systems, and has been shown to be inappropriate for developing resilient 
infrastructure (Cox, 2009).   
This thesis provides a network analysis tool to suggest how limited funds should 
be used to protect, back up, or build additional components in an infrastructure network 
to increase resilience to malicious attacks or natural disasters.  We calculate resilience as 
robustness of system operating cost to a range of attacks or to a worst-case attack or 
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disaster.  We show how to maximize resilience of infrastructure networks and compare 
our result with the RAMCAP method, which the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) currently requires. 
We propose two ways to assessing and improve infrastructure resilience: an 
Attacker-Defender model and the Design-Attack-Defend model.  With Attacker-
Defender, we first model the operation of a rail network using a multi-commodity 
network flow optimization that minimizes shipping costs (and penalties for non-delivery), 
then wraps an attacker model around it that discovers attacks to maximize the resulting 
minimum cost of operating the surviving network.  Design-Attack-Defend extends 
Attacker-Defender by adding defensive decisions that minimize the resulting worst-case 
attack costs. 
This thesis uses the Western U.S. railroad network as a case study.  Our model of 
network operation prescribes how the network should be managed in any state to deal 
with disruptions, delays, and incremental costs inflicted by a Transportation Security 
Incident (TSI) on the U.S. West Coast commercial rail industry. The Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) defines a TSI as, “A security incident resulting in 
significant loss of life, environmental damage, transportation system disruption, or 
economic disruption in a particular area” (TSA, 2009).  We offer an assessment tool that 
is more reliable than PRA in identifying vulnerabilities of networks and can help policy 
makers allocate money for defending or adding additional infrastructure to a network. 
A. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
The Western U.S. rail network is a vital resource for moving large amounts of 
supplies, such as food, water, and fuel, to large population centers and for moving large 
amounts of heavy equipment for both military and disaster response organizations.  In its 
national Rail and Infrastructure Study, the Department of Transportation (DOT) estimates 
that the demand for rail freight transportation, measured in tonnage, will nearly double by 
2035 (DOT, 2008).  It is important to maintain the ability to move supplies via the rail 
network in order to respond quickly to an unforeseen event.   Figure 1 shows the location 
of the existing railroads in California, a subset of the Western U.S. railroad network.   
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Figure 1.   Diagram of California Component of the Western U.S. Railroad Network   
The current Western U.S. railroad network was not designed to withstand a 
malicious attack, and as a result, is a prime target for an adversary with limited means to 
cause significant damage.  The existing studies of rail transportation requirements and 
possible expansions do not take into account the impact of a TSI (DOT, 2008).  Rail is a 
key infrastructure because, for example, the majority of the nation’s major seaports, 
which are responsible for 90 percent of the imports and exports to the U.S. at an annual 
value of $800 billion, are connected to major distribution cities by railroads (BTS, 2008).  
In addition, the rail network acts as a vital resource to the military by moving large 
amounts of heavy equipment and ordinance to military bases inside the U.S.   Our rail 
infrastructure is a prime example of a system designed with no regard to resilience, 
having just enough capacity to work under normal operating conditions, and extremely 
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vulnerable to even a moderate amount of disruption. This infrastructure was designed to 
convey freight at competitive costs, not to resist attacks by intelligent terrorists bent on 
maximizing operational disruption. 
B. MODELS DISCUSSED 
For rail systems, the RAMCAP calculated risk is proportional to the amount of 
flow on each arc (an arc is a length of rail connecting two cities) (Alion Science and 
Technology Corporation, 2009).  RAMCAP recommends defending the arcs in 
decreasing order of rank until available funds for defenses are depleted.  RAMCAP 
performs no analysis of network function after an attack, nor does it consider the 
influence of adding new components to the critical infrastructure.   
Our proposed Attacker-Defender algorithm determines the locations of the worst-
case attacks for various levels of attacker effort, and the resulting responding optimal 
flows over the damaged network.  To determine the best defense using Attacker-
Defender, we first allow the enemy one attack and then defend the arc that corresponds to 
the worst-case single attack by making that arc invulnerable.  Once that arc is defended, 
we then run the Attacker-Defender algorithm on the new defended network to determine 
the operating cost of the network after attacking the defended network.   
On the second run, the number of attacks is set to a constant value; for our 
analysis, we set the maximum number of attacks to five.  We then allow the defender to 
increase the number of defenses, which means increasing the number of invulnerable arcs 
with the given number of attacks, held constant, and record the operating cost of the 
network after each new defense is added.  Attacker-Defender does not consider building 
additional infrastructure, but instead only allows for hardening of existing infrastructure 
to render it essentially invulnerable.   
Our Design-Attack-Defend model is a tri-level model that determines how best to 
design against a worst-case attack (as determined from the bi-level Attacker-Defender 
model) in response to that defense.  We solve Design-Attack-Defend by determining a 
worst-case attack in the presence of no defense.  We then choose a defense plan (that 
either protects existing infrastructure or adds new infrastructure) that is robust, i.e., that  
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minimizes the resulting damage that would result from any set of attacks seen so far.  We 
repeat attacking and defending until the cost of operating the network after the worst-case 
attack and defense converge.  
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II. ATTACKER-DEFENDER AND DESIGN-ATTACK-DEFEND 
MODELS OF INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE 
A. ATTACKER-DEFENDER MODEL 
For any fixed number of attacks, our two-level Attacker-Defender (AD) model is 
formulated to determine the set of arcs to attack that maximizes the resulting minimum 
operating cost in the network (Brown et al., 2005). 
1. Mathematical Formulation 
Sets 
n N     nodes in network (alias: i,j,p) 
 ,i j A   arcs in network 
Data 
p
ib    supply of commodity p at city i 
iju    capacity on arc  ,i j A   
ijc    cost on arc  ,i j A   
ijq    penalty cost on arc  ,i j A , if attacked 
maxAttacks  max number of attacks allowed 
 
Decision Variables: 
pijX   flow on arc (i, j) with commodity p  
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The objective function, (AD1), calculates the cost of operating the network after 
an attack occurs.  Constraint (AD2) ensures balance of flow to all supply and demand 
nodes, for each commodity.  Constraint (AD3) ensures that the flow on arc ( , )i j  does not 
exceed the capacity of arc ( , )i j .  Finally, constraint (AD4) limits the maximum number 
of attacks to the user-specified limit, and stipulations (AD5) require the attacks to be 
binary.  
2. Planning Defenses Using AD 
We now provide a heuristic algorithm to illustrate how we can determine 
reasonable defense plans for a range of defense plan sizes, s, between one and eleven 
arcs, using AD in response to an anticipated attack.  For the purpose of illustration, we 
will evaluate all defense plans against the optimal resulting five-arc attack.  (We could 
evaluate each defense plan against a range of attack sizes, and we have done so, but we 
choose a five-arc attack to illustrate our results over the range of defense plans.)  To 
determine a reasonable set of s arcs to defend, we first solve AD allowing the attacker s 
arcs to attack. We then defend the s arcs he chose to attack by setting their ijq  values to 
zero.  In order to evaluate the effectiveness of this defense, and to compare it to defenses 
of other sizes, we then solve the modified AD model for the optimal resulting five-arc 
attack. 
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For example, we first determine a one-arc defense by first running the Attacker-
Defender algorithm with maxAttacks = 1.  The Attacker-Defender algorithm will then 
report the worst-case single attack, which in our case is the arc from Los Angeles to 
Burbank.  We then defend that arc by setting its attacked cost, 0ijq  .   
The second step is to attack the network with the newly-defended arc, allowing 
the enemy five attacks and recording the operating cost.  This is done by setting 
maxAttacks = 5 and attacking the network (with the new defended arc having 0ijq  ).   
This gives us our first data point for the Attacker-Defender model allowing the operator 
to defend one arc against five attacks.   
To determine two defenses, we first run the Attacker-Defender algorithm 
allowing the enemy two attacks; that is, setting maxAttacks = 2.  The resulting worst-case 
attack is Los Angeles to Burbank and Los Angeles to Glendale.  We then defend both 
arcs by setting their respective 0ijq  .  Next, we attack the new defended network, with 
both 0ijq  , by running the Attacker-Defender model with maxAttacks = 5, and record 
the operating cost of the network after two defenses against five attacks.  We continue 
this increasing the number of allowed defenses until there was no attack on the network 
that would increase the operating cost.  The algorithm used is below:   
1. For s = 1 to Given a fixed number of defenses (numDefenses) 
a. Solve AD for optimal attack by setting maxAttacks = s 
b. Protect the arcs that correspond to the worst-case attack by setting 
0ijq   
c. Solve AD for optimal attack with defended arcs 0ijq  and maxAttacks = 
5 
d. Record the operating cost of the network with s defenses and 5 attacks 
e. Set all 1ijq   
2. End For Loop 
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B. DESIGN-ATTACK-DEFEND MODEL 
We formulate the problem of designing a rail network that is resilient to attack as 
a Design-Attack-Defend (DAD) model (Brown et al., 2006), where we now introduce 
decision variables V that explicitly represent the (defender’s) choice of arcs to protect or 
build in the network.  For each arc (or potential arc) in the network, we introduce a set of 
defense options, indexed by d, that are available for that arc.  The set of defense options 
for a given arc will always include a special option, d0, which represents the arc in its 
current state.  This special defense option is the “do-nothing” option for this arc, and 
choosing this option for an arc will not consume any defense budget we might impose.  
Any other defense option for that arc will have new arc data associated with choosing it, 
such as a new operating cost, a new capacity, and a new penalty cost. 
1. Mathematical Formulation 
Sets: 
n N     nodes in network (alias: i,j,p) 
 ,i j A   arcs in network 
d D    defense options 
k   attack iteration index 
    defense iteration index 
Data: 
p
ib    demand for commodity p at city i 
d
iju    capacity on arc  ,i j A  under defense plan d 
d
ijc    cost on arc  ,i j A  under defense plan d 
d
ijq    penalty cost on arc  ,i j A , if attacked, under defense 
plan d 
maxAttacks maximum number of attacks allowed 






pijX   flow with destination p on arc (i, j) under defense plan d [p-
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ijY    = 1 if arc (i, j) attacked [binary] 
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The objective function, (DAD1), calculates the operating cost of the network after 
an attack occurs.  Constraint (DAD2) ensures balance of flow to all supply and demand 
nodes, for each commodity.  Constraint (DAD3) requires that exactly one defense option 
be chosen for each component in the network.  Of course, each arc has the “do-nothing” 
defense option, d0, available; choosing this option for each arc in the network is a 
feasible, but probably sub-optimal, defense plan.  Constraint (DAD4) ensures that the 
flow on arc (i,j) does not exceed the capacity of arc (i,j) for the chosen defense plan.  
Constraint (DAD5) limits the maximum number of attacks to the user specified limit.  
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Finally, constraint (DAD6) forces the model to defend arcs within the available budget 
constraints (represented here as a simple cardinality constraint).  
Design-Attack-Defend determines the best place to protect existing infrastructure 
or build additional infrastructure that will minimize the cost of operating a network after 
a worst-case attack.  Unfortunately, Design-Attack-Defend is not a linear program and 
cannot be solved using linear programming techniques.  Therefore, we separate the model 
into a master problem that determines defenses and arc flows, and a subproblem that 
determines optimal attacks against any given (i.e., fixed) defense.  We use a Benders 
Decomposition algorithm to solve the model. 
2. Decomposition Algorithm to Solve DAD 
Our algorithm for solving DAD considers a sequence of defense plans, solves AD 
to evaluate each of those defense plans, and keeps a record of every attack seen so far.  It 
then determines a new, improved defense plan that is optimal against all attacks seen up 
to that point.  The algorithm terminates when the AD model does not determine a new, 
effective attack, or when it cannot find any improvement to the best defense plan found 
so far. 
At each Benders iteration, for any fixed defense plan, the subproblem (SUB) 
evaluates the worst-case attack plan for that defense by solving AD using the arc data for 
the defense options chosen for each arc. 
a. Subproblem (SUB) 
Given any fixed defense plan dijV , we define our subproblem to be AD 
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SUB determines the optimal attack for the current, fixed defense plan.  It 
is a modified version of AD, using cost, capacity, and attack cost data as determined by 
that defense plan.  We solve the model above the same way as AD.  Once SUB finds the 
optimal attack, that attack is added to list of attacks seen so far and the MASTER 
problem is called to determine a new optimal defense plan. 
b. Master Problem (CREATE_DEFENSE) 
At iteration k, given the finite list of k attack plans found so far by SUB, 
k
ijY , the master problem, CREATE_DEFENSE, determines the optimal defense that 
minimizes the resulting operating cost under the worst of these attacks.  Therefore, each 
attack provides a lower bound on the value of the defense plan chosen.  Because the 
flows are chosen after the attacker chooses an attack, each of the k attacks has its own set 







n N     nodes in network (alias: i,j,p) 
 ,i j A   arcs in network 
d D    defense options 
k   attack iteration index 
    defense iteration index 
Data: 
p
ib    demand for commodity p at city i 
d
iju    capacity on arc  ,i j A  under defense plan d 
d
ijc    cost on arc  ,i j A  under defense plan d 
d
ijq    penalty cost on arc  ,i j A , if attacked, under 
defense plan d 




pijXK   flow with destination p on arc (i, j) under defense d 
after attack k 
ijY    = 1 if arc (i, j) attacked [binary] 
d
ijV   = 1 if defense option d is chosen for arc (i, j) 
[binary] 
Formulation CREATE_DEFENSE: 
min DEFV Z  
Subject to: 
, ( , )
( ) (CD1)
kd d dk
ij pijDEF ij ij
p d i j
Z c q Y kXK  
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The objective function of the CREATE_DEFENSE model minimizes the 
cost of operating the network.  The Constraint (CD1) bounds the cost of operating the 
network with the defense plan using the kth attack found by SUB.  Constraint (CD2) 
maintains balance of flow for each node, for each commodity, under each attack k, and 
ensures the network meets all demand.  Constraint (CD3) forces the model to choose only 
one defense plan for each component on the network.  Constraint (CD4) ensures that the 
new flow on the new network does not exceed the capacity of the arc for the given 
defense plan, and for each attack k.  Constraint (CD5) ensures the total cost of the 
additional infrastructure does not exceed the available funds, again, represented here as a 
simple cardinality constraint. 
c. Algorithm for DESIGN-ATTACK-DEFEND 
Design-Attack-Defend solves CREATE_DEFENSE after every new attack 
found by SUB.  After determining a new defense plan by solving CREATE_DEFENSE, 
our decomposition then solves the subproblem (SUB) to find the optimal attack against 
the new defense plan, and the optimal response to that attack given the additional 
infrastructure created by CREATE_DEFENSE.  It alternates between 
CREATE_DEFENSE and SUB thereby creating new infrastructure and then attacking the 
new network until the costs of attacking and defending the network converge, and we 
have found the optimal placement of additional infrastructure that will minimize the cost 
of operating the network for all possible attacks.  Below is a list of the parameters used 





v_ub  upper bound on current defense plan 
v_lb  lower bound on current defense plan 
max_iter  maximum iterations 
defense_tol acceptable optimality gap for solutions to DAD 
attack_tol  acceptable relative optimality gap for SUB 
k
ijY    fixed attack at iteration k 
d
ijV    fixed defense plan 
 
1. Pseudo code for the Design-Attack-Defend Algorithm: 
0 ( , ) ,kijY i j A k     
0 ( , ) ,dijV i j A d     
v_ub = INF 
v_lb = -INF 
k = 1 
While (v_ub – v_lb) > defense_tol*v_lb and k<max_iter 
Solve SUB to obtain attack_tol-optimal solution Y with 
value Z and upper bound Z_UB 
If v_ub > Z_UB: 
v_ub = Z_UB 
*d d
ij ijv V  for all  ,i j A , for all d 
Set kij ijy Y  for all  ,i j A  
Solve CREATE_DEFENSE to obtain optimal solution 
V with value ZDef 
If ZDef > v_lb 




Design-Attack-Defend offers an optimal or near-optimal (for difficult 
instances) solution for determining where to build additional critical infrastructure.  As is 
shown in the analysis below, it is not possible for Attacker-Defender or RAMCAP to 
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give a solution that is better than the Design-Attack-Defend algorithm.  It is important to 
note that if there is no attacker, that is numAttacks = 0, then the Design-Attack-Defend 
model reduces to a classis multi-commodity network design problem (Balakrishnam et 
al., 1997).   The complete GAMS code (GAMS, 2009) is available from the author or his 
thesis advisors.  
 18
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III. DESIGN-ATTACK-DEFEND RESULTS 
A. CASE STUDY: WESTERN U.S. RAILROAD NETWORK 
Appendix A provides the graph underlying the Western U.S. railroad network; 
there are 96 nodes, representing stations along a rail line or the junction of more than one 
rail line, and 225 arcs, representing segments of track connecting the nodes.  Table 1 is a 
sample of the data in Appendix A.  Every node appears at least once in either the “Tail” 
column or the “Head” column.  The “Tail” column is the city from which goods are 
leaving and the “Head” column is the adjacent city on the network where the goods are 
going.  Every arc in our graph also has an associated cost, capacity, and additional cost if 
attacked.  If no defensive preparations have been made for an arc, we say that the 
defender chose the “do-nothing” defense option for that arc, and then its per-unit cost for 
traffic is simply one dollar per pound.  Likewise, its capacity is 2,000,000 pounds per 
day, and, if it is attacked, the additional penalty cost on shipping goods across that arc is 
$101 per pound.  If the defender chooses to protect the arc, then attacks have no effect, 
and so the additional penalty for goods shipped across such an arc is zero.  In more 
complex scenarios, several defense options can be defined for each arc, each with its own 









Bakersfield Palmdale_Airport  
Table 1.   Sample California Commercial Rail Graph Adjacencies. 
Appendix B shows the complete demand matrix for the Western U.S. railroad 
network.  Each column in Appendix B shows demand node, and each row is the supply 
node.  Table 2 provides an excerpt of this demand data.  Each entry is notional data 
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estimated based on the populations of the respective cities, and is proportional to the 
product of those two populations (U.S. Census, 2000). 
 
Albany Anaheim Antioch‐Pit Bakersfield Barstow BellinghamBerkeley
Albany 12130 ‐5 ‐18 ‐7 ‐78 ‐694 ‐16
Anaheim ‐1995 243851 ‐362 ‐133 ‐1553 ‐13840 ‐319
Antioch‐Pittsburgh ‐551 ‐28 67230 ‐37 ‐429 ‐3820 ‐88
Bakersfield ‐1501 ‐75 ‐273 183524 ‐1169 ‐10418 ‐240
Barstow ‐128 ‐6 ‐23 ‐9 15607 ‐891 ‐21  
Table 2.   California Commercial Rail Demand.   
For example, Albany has 12,130 pounds of goods to ship.  From Albany, 
Anaheim has a demand of 5 pounds, Antioch-Pit has a demand of 18 pounds, and 
Bakersfield has a demand of 7 pounds. 
B. RAMCAP 
RAMCAP is a probabilistic risk analysis method that calculates risk using the 
equation Risk=Vulnerability*Threat*Consequence.  RAMCAP ranks arcs by calculated 
risk.  In the absence of any actionable intelligence regarding threat to individual 
components in our infrastructure, the standard approach in RAMCAP is to assume all 
threats are equal, and so, without loss of generality, “Threat”=1.  We assume that any 
attack against undefended rail segments will be successful, and, therefore, that 
“Vulnerability”=1 as well.  Finally, we must choose a single, scalar number for each arc 
to represent the consequence of losing it.  The only reasonable consequence value we can 
calculate is the actual flow on each arc in the network when no components have been 
attacked, and so “Consequence”=flow on each arc.    For rail systems, then, the risk of an 
arc is proportional to the flow on that arc; therefore, the arc with the highest flow is the 
most critical (Alion Science and Technology Corporation, 2009).  The RAMCAP user 
then sorts arcs by amount of flow.  RAMCAP suggests defending the arcs in decreasing 
order of flow until available resources run out.  RAMCAP assumes that by protecting 
individual arcs in the network, the overall performance increases.   
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To determine the effectiveness of RAMCAP, we first evaluate the network 
performance after an attack, then we compare with performance before an attack.  In 
order to determine the effectiveness of RAMCAP, we rank all of the components using 
the risk measure above, and then, for each number of defenses numDef, we make the top 
numDef components from that ranked list invulnerable, and evaluate that defense plan by 
running the Attacker-Defender model on that modified network.  Figure 2 shows how 
network improves as the number of defenses increases using the RAMCAP defense plan.  
Notice that RAMCAP defense, allowing the enemy five attacks, has an 11.67% increase 
in cost after 18 defenses. The reason is, RAMCAP does not anticipate the best place for 
an attack and only adds defenses based on current flow before an attack.  RAMCAP’s 
inability to anticipate the enemy’s worst attack for a given defense plan allows the enemy 
to find a weakness in the defense by analyzing possible flow after an attack, and to attack 
arcs in such a way as to minimize capability after an attack. 
 
 
Figure 2.   RAMCAP–Percent Increase in Operating Costs of Network vs. Number of 
Defenses 
The optimal RAMCAP defense plan is in Table 3.  We analyze the “optimal” (i.e., 
greedy, myopic heuristic) RAMCAP defense plan by setting the defenses in accordance 
with the optimal RAMCAP defense plan and then running the bi-level Attacker-Defender 
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model shown above to determine the percent degradation after five attacks versus the 
number of indicated defenses.  Table 3 shows the RAMCAP defense plan. 
 





5 Red Bluff Chico
6 Dunsmuir Redding
7 Redding Red Bluff
8 Klamath Fall Dunsmuir
9 Stockton Modesto








18 Bakersfield Glendale  
Table 3.   RAMCAP Defense Plan 
The first column is the number of defenses; the head and tail column correspond 
to the head and tail of the arc that is added to the RAMCAP defense plan as the number 
of allowed defenses increases. 
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C. ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACKER-DEFENDER ALGORITHM 
 
The Defense plan for the bi-level Attacker-Defender model is shown below:  
1-6 Defenses   10 Defenses 
Los Angeles Burbank   Los Angeles Glendale 
Los Angeles Glendale   Los Angeles Industry 
Pomona Los Angeles   Norwalk Industry 
Red Bluff Chico   Oakland Airport Industry 
San Jose Berkeley   Oroville Marysville 
Richmond Martinez   San Bernardino Pomona 
7 Defenses   San Jose Berkeley 
Los Angeles Glendale   San Jose Redwood City 
Pomona Los Angeles   Sylmar Burbank 
Red Bluff Chico   Tahoe Roseville 
Richmond Martinez   11 Defenses 
Santa Clarita Los Angeles   Glendale Bakersfield 
Sylmar Burbank   Los Angeles Industry 
Union City Oakland Airport   Norwalk Industry 
8 Defenses   Oakland Airport Industry 
Los Angeles Burbank   Oroville Marysville 
Los Angeles Glendale   Pomona Los Angeles 
Redding Dunsmuir   Richmond Berkeley 
Richmond Berkeley   San Juan Capistrano Irvine 
San Bernardino Pomona   San Luis Obispo Salinas 
Santa Clarita Los Angeles   Sylmar Burbank 
Tahoe Roseville   Tahoe Roseville 
Union City Oakland Airport       
9 Defenses       
Los Angeles Glendale       
Oroville Marysville       
Richmond Martinez       
Riverside Oakland Airport       
San Bernardino Pomona       
San Juan Capistrano Irvine       
Santa Clarita Los Angeles       
Sylmar Burbank       
Union City Oakland Airport       
Table 4.   Defense Plans Determined by AD 
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The six-arc defense suggested by AD includes the first six arcs.  Note that the 
seven-arc defense does not contain the six-arc defense plan suggested by AD, and that, 
therefore, defense plans are not necessarily monotonic.  That is, there is no optimal 
ranking of defenses, and forcing such ranking, as RAMCAP would, is an unnecessary 
restriction of defense efforts that can lead to degraded results. 
The columns correspond to the head and tail of the defended arc.  As the number 
of defenses increases, the arcs that are defended change in accordance with the Attacker-
Defender algorithm, and do so in a non-monotonic fashion.  For example, the seven-arc 
defense suggested by AD does not include the six-arc defense as a proper subset.  This 
means that there is no strict ranking of components to defend.  AD suggests sets of 
components to defend, and those sets depend on the number of components to be 
defended.   
 
Figure 3.   Percent Increase in Operating Costs of Network vs. Number of Defenses 
Using AD 
Figure 3 shows how the optimal operating cost of the attacked network decreases 
as the number of defenses increase.  The graph reveals a tremendous benefit to be gained 
by even one defense.  Successive defenses are less effective, but still improve the 
resilience of the network.  The graph shows that after eleven defenses, there is no 
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additional gain from additional infrastructure because the attacker has no effective five-
arc attack against the optimal eleven-arc defense. The system is as robust as we need to 
make it for this attack scenario. 
D. ANALYSIS OF THE DESIGN-ATTACK-DEFEND MODEL 
Figure 4 shows the percent of degradation to the Western U.S. railroad network 
versus the number of allowed defenses using Design-Attack-Defend.  The analysis below 
allows the enemy five attacks.  Notice that the percent degradation versus the number of 




Figure 4.   Network Increase in Operating Costs vs. Number of Defenses 
As can be seen in Figure 4, the first defense improves the cost of moving goods 
on the Western U.S. railroad network by 10 percent.  After three defenses, the rail 
network is only degraded 1.7% by five attacks.  At seven defenses, there is no attack plan 
that consists of five attacks that can degrade flow on the rail network.  Design-Attack-
Defend is able to determine where the worst-case five-arc attack occurs, and ensure that 
goods can be shipped around all possible attacks in order to meet supply and demand.  
Table 5 shows how the defense plan responding to five attacks changes as the number of 
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affordable defenses increases.  Note that, again, as the number of affordable defenses 
increases, the arcs defended do not appear in a priority order.  That is, sets of arcs are 
chosen for defense, rather than individual arcs in any particular myopic order.  This is 
more evidence that a strict ranking of defenses is a restriction of optimal behavior, and a 
restriction of unknown severity to the defender.  
 
1 Defense:   6 Defenses: 
Industry Los Angeles   Bakersfield Glendale 
2 Defenses:   Berkeley San Jose 
Bakersfield Glendale   Burbank Los Angeles 
Marysville Oroville   Industry Los Angeles 
3 Defenses:   Industry Norwalk 
Industry Oakland   Martinez Richmond 
Martinez Suisun Fair    7 Defenses: 
Marysville Oroville   Bakersfield Glendale 
4 Defenses:   Berkeley San Jose 
Berkeley San Jose   Burbank Los Angeles 
Chico Red Bluff   Industry Los Angeles 
Industry Los Angeles   Industry Norwalk 
Marysville Oroville   Industry Oakland Airport 
5 Defenses:   Marysville Oroville 
Marysville Oroville   8 Defenses: 
Industry Los Angeles   Bakersfield Glendale 
Industry Norwalk   Burbank Sylmar 
Industry Oakland   Industry Los Angeles 
Roseville Tahoe   Industry Norwalk 
      Industry Oakland Airport 
      Los Angeles Pomona 
      Martinez Richmond 
      Marysville Oroville 
Table 5.   DAD Defense Plan 
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E. COMPARISON OF DESIGN-ATTACK-DEFEND VERSES ATTACKER-
DEFENDER AND RAMCAP 
Figure 5 compares the three network analysis methods.  We base the analysis on 
allowing the enemy five attacks.  The graph below shows the operating cost of the 
network after five attacks versus the number of defenses allowed using the indicated 
network analysis algorithms. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Comparison of Network Analysis Methods 
As can be seen in Figure 5, Attacker-Defender outperforms RAMCAP.  Attacker-
Defender quickly determines the worst-case attack scenario and defends against it.  As 
soon as Attacker-Defender is able to defend against all attacks, the amount of degradation 
to the network goes to zero.  RAMCAP never yields a good defense, except when there is 
an unlimited defense budget.  RAMCAP, and other PRA techniques, cannot consider 
adding additional infrastructure or redundant capacity, because they do not model 
infrastructure system function; they only evaluate individual components as they are 
currently configured.  Design-Attack-Defend considers new infrastructure or additional 
capacity for additional infrastructure with minimal additional data.  For this study, we did 
not use the additional infrastructure feature of Design-Attack-Defend, and chose to only 
make existing arcs invulnerable to offer a more direct comparison with RAMCAP.   
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If we were to consider additional infrastructure, Design-Attack-Defend would 
produce a solution at least as good as the defend-only option that we have chosen for our 
comparison.  Therefore, Design-Attack-Defend can only perform better as we increase 
the number of additional components it can consider to reinforce or enhance the network. 
For this problem, we have 96 nodes and 215 arcs, for the Attacker-Defender 
models there are 4,738 equations and 22,169 single variables for the cases where the 
attacker is given five attacks and the defender is allowed five defenses.  For the Design-
Attack-Defend model, there are 6,401 equations and 33,667 single variables for the five-
attack and five-defense scenario. 
Figure 5 also shows that the Design-Attack-Defend model provides significant 
improvement over the bi-level Attacker-Defender model for three to six defenses, and a 
significant improvement over RAMCAP for any number of defenses.  If you can only 
afford to protect or add a few components, then Design-Attack-Defend is evidently the 
only reasonable way to determine how to create resilient infrastructure.  
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FOLLOW-UP RESEARCH 
Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) does not 
model the operation of the infrastructure being analyzed (in fact, it assumes that any 
notion of infrastructure “function” is summarized in the scalar value representing the 
consequence of losing an individual component).  RAMCAP does not consider 
interactions among components in a complex critical infrastructure system, and it does 
not consider the worst-case possible attack an adversary could inflict against that 
infrastructure.  Additionally, RAMCAP does not perform any analysis on the resilience 
of the new network after protecting existing infrastructure, and does not even consider the 
possibility of building additional infrastructure to enhance resilience. 
Design-Attack-Defend is superior to RAMCAP and mere Attack-Defender 
models.  Planning defenses based on Design-Attack-Defend will ensure maximum 
robustness to an attack, and will ensure the optimal flow of goods after a malicious attack 
or, as a side benefit, a natural disaster.  The reason Design-Attack-Defend renders better 
advice than RAMCAP, is that RAMCAP simply defends the arcs with the highest amount 
of flow on them and does not analyze how a network is used after a malicious attack or 
natural disaster.  Design-Attack-Defend performs better than the bi-level Attacker-
Defender model because the Attacker-Defender model only looks at where the optimal 
attack will occur and does not consider how the optimal attacks will change in response 
to any given defense plan.  The decision maker using the Attacker-Defender model can 
only defend the arcs that will cause the most damage when an attack occurs, and cannot 
perform any analysis on how to flow goods around an attack.  Only Design-Attack-
Defend shows how to flow goods around an attack and performs analysis on how the 
network is operated after an attack.  For the Western U.S. railroad network, as presented 
here, we find that Design-Attack-Defend is clearly the most effective model to use when 
performing network analysis to determine where to defend infrastructure, but that the 
Attacker-Defender model is still better than PRA-based methods such as RAMCAP. 
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APPENDIX B:  WESTERN U.S. RAILROAD NETWORKDEMAND 
MATRIX 
Albany Anaheim Antioch‐Pit Bakersfield Barstow Bell inghamBerkeley Bingen‐whi Burbank
Albany 12130 ‐5 ‐18 ‐7 ‐78 ‐694 ‐16 ‐190 ‐16
Anaheim ‐1995 243851 ‐362 ‐133 ‐1553 ‐13840 ‐319 ‐3783 ‐327
Antioch‐Pittsburgh ‐551 ‐28 67230 ‐37 ‐429 ‐3820 ‐88 ‐1044 ‐90
Bakersfield ‐1501 ‐75 ‐273 183524 ‐1169 ‐10418 ‐240 ‐2848 ‐246
Barstow ‐128 ‐6 ‐23 ‐9 15607 ‐891 ‐21 ‐244 ‐21
Bell ingham ‐14 ‐1 ‐3 ‐1 ‐11 1663 ‐2 ‐27 ‐2
Berkeley ‐625 ‐31 ‐113 ‐42 ‐486 ‐4335 76312 ‐1185 ‐102
Bingen‐white_Salmon ‐53 ‐3 ‐10 ‐4 ‐41 ‐366 ‐8 6348 ‐9
Burbank ‐610 ‐31 ‐111 ‐41 ‐475 ‐4233 ‐98 ‐1157 74507
Burbank_Airport ‐610 ‐31 ‐111 ‐41 ‐475 ‐4233 ‐98 ‐1157 ‐100
Centrailia ‐32 ‐2 ‐6 ‐2 ‐25 ‐224 ‐5 ‐61 ‐5
Chemult ‐146 ‐7 ‐27 ‐10 ‐114 ‐1012 ‐23 ‐277 ‐24
Chico ‐368 ‐18 ‐67 ‐25 ‐287 ‐2553 ‐59 ‐698 ‐60
Colfax ‐9 0 ‐2 ‐1 ‐7 ‐64 ‐1 ‐18 ‐2
Corcoran ‐127 ‐6 ‐23 ‐8 ‐99 ‐879 ‐20 ‐240 ‐21
Davis ‐367 ‐18 ‐67 ‐24 ‐286 ‐2545 ‐59 ‐696 ‐60
Dunsmuir ‐12 ‐1 ‐2 ‐1 ‐9 ‐81 ‐2 ‐22 ‐2
Edmonds ‐161 ‐8 ‐29 ‐11 ‐126 ‐1120 ‐26 ‐306 ‐26
Ephrata ‐5 0 ‐1 0 ‐4 ‐33 ‐1 ‐9 ‐1
Escondido ‐813 ‐41 ‐148 ‐54 ‐633 ‐5640 ‐130 ‐1542 ‐133
Eugene ‐56 ‐3 ‐10 ‐4 ‐43 ‐387 ‐9 ‐106 ‐9
Everett ‐159 ‐8 ‐29 ‐11 ‐124 ‐1102 ‐25 ‐301 ‐26
Fresno ‐2601 ‐130 ‐472 ‐173 ‐2025 ‐18044 ‐416 ‐4933 ‐426
Fullerton ‐766 ‐38 ‐139 ‐51 ‐597 ‐5317 ‐123 ‐1453 ‐126
Gilroy ‐252 ‐13 ‐46 ‐17 ‐196 ‐1750 ‐40 ‐478 ‐41
Glendale ‐1186 ‐59 ‐215 ‐79 ‐923 ‐8227 ‐190 ‐2249 ‐194
Hanford ‐254 ‐13 ‐46 ‐17 ‐197 ‐1759 ‐41 ‐481 ‐42
Hinkle ‐38 ‐2 ‐7 ‐3 ‐30 ‐266 ‐6 ‐73 ‐6
Indio ‐299 ‐15 ‐54 ‐20 ‐233 ‐2072 ‐48 ‐567 ‐49
Industry ‐5 0 ‐1 0 ‐4 ‐33 ‐1 ‐9 ‐1
Irvine ‐870 ‐44 ‐158 ‐58 ‐677 ‐6037 ‐139 ‐1650 ‐143
Kelso‐Longview ‐56 ‐3 ‐10 ‐4 ‐44 ‐389 ‐9 ‐106 ‐9
Klamath_Falls ‐124 ‐6 ‐22 ‐8 ‐96 ‐857 ‐20 ‐234 ‐20
Los_Angeles ‐22469 ‐1126 ‐4081 ‐1496 ‐17495 ‐155896 ‐3596 ‐42615 ‐3683
Madera ‐263 ‐13 ‐48 ‐17 ‐205 ‐1823 ‐42 ‐498 ‐43
Martinez ‐218 ‐11 ‐40 ‐15 ‐170 ‐1513 ‐35 ‐414 ‐36
Marysvil le ‐75 ‐4 ‐14 ‐5 ‐58 ‐518 ‐12 ‐141 ‐12
Merced ‐389 ‐19 ‐71 ‐26 ‐303 ‐2696 ‐62 ‐737 ‐64
Modesto ‐1149 ‐58 ‐209 ‐76 ‐894 ‐7969 ‐184 ‐2178 ‐188
Moorpark_Simi_Valley ‐191 ‐10 ‐35 ‐13 ‐149 ‐1326 ‐31 ‐362 ‐31
Mt_Vernon ‐430 ‐22 ‐78 ‐29 ‐335 ‐2983 ‐69 ‐816 ‐70
Murrieta ‐269 ‐14 ‐49 ‐18 ‐210 ‐1868 ‐43 ‐511 ‐44
Needles ‐29 ‐1 ‐5 ‐2 ‐23 ‐204 ‐5 ‐56 ‐5
Norwalk ‐634 ‐32 ‐115 ‐42 ‐494 ‐4402 ‐102 ‐1203 ‐104  
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Albany Anaheim Antioch‐Pit Bakersfield Barstow BellinghamBerkeley Bingen‐whi Burbank
Oakland ‐2430 ‐122 ‐441 ‐162 ‐1892 ‐16859 ‐389 ‐4609 ‐398
Oakland_Airport ‐2430 ‐122 ‐441 ‐162 ‐1892 ‐16859 ‐389 ‐4609 ‐398
Oceanside ‐979 ‐49 ‐178 ‐65 ‐763 ‐6795 ‐157 ‐1857 ‐161
Olympia‐Lacey ‐107 ‐5 ‐19 ‐7 ‐83 ‐743 ‐17 ‐203 ‐18
Orovil le ‐79 ‐4 ‐14 ‐5 ‐62 ‐549 ‐13 ‐150 ‐13
Palm_Springs ‐260 ‐13 ‐47 ‐17 ‐203 ‐1806 ‐42 ‐494 ‐43
Palmdale_Airport ‐709 ‐36 ‐129 ‐47 ‐552 ‐4923 ‐114 ‐1346 ‐116
Pasadena ‐814 ‐41 ‐148 ‐54 ‐634 ‐5651 ‐130 ‐1545 ‐134
Pasco ‐233 ‐12 ‐42 ‐16 ‐182 ‐1620 ‐37 ‐443 ‐38
Pomona ‐909 ‐46 ‐165 ‐61 ‐708 ‐6307 ‐145 ‐1724 ‐149
Portland ‐241 ‐12 ‐44 ‐16 ‐188 ‐1672 ‐39 ‐457 ‐39
Red_Bluff ‐80 ‐4 ‐15 ‐5 ‐62 ‐555 ‐13 ‐152 ‐13
Redding ‐492 ‐25 ‐89 ‐33 ‐383 ‐3412 ‐79 ‐933 ‐81
Redwood_City ‐459 ‐23 ‐83 ‐31 ‐357 ‐3182 ‐73 ‐870 ‐75
Richmond ‐603 ‐30 ‐110 ‐40 ‐470 ‐4186 ‐97 ‐1144 ‐99
Riverbank ‐96 ‐5 ‐17 ‐6 ‐75 ‐668 ‐15 ‐183 ‐16
Riverside ‐1552 ‐78 ‐282 ‐103 ‐1208 ‐10766 ‐248 ‐2943 ‐254
Rosevil le ‐486 ‐24 ‐88 ‐32 ‐378 ‐3372 ‐78 ‐922 ‐80
Sacramento ‐2475 ‐124 ‐450 ‐165 ‐1927 ‐17174 ‐396 ‐4695 ‐406
Salem ‐208 ‐10 ‐38 ‐14 ‐162 ‐1445 ‐33 ‐395 ‐34
Salinas ‐868 ‐43 ‐158 ‐58 ‐676 ‐6020 ‐139 ‐1646 ‐142
San_Fransisco ‐4724 ‐237 ‐858 ‐315 ‐3678 ‐32774 ‐756 ‐8959 ‐774
San_Bernadido ‐1127 ‐57 ‐205 ‐75 ‐878 ‐7822 ‐180 ‐2138 ‐185
San_Clemente ‐304 ‐15 ‐55 ‐20 ‐236 ‐2107 ‐49 ‐576 ‐50
San_Diego ‐7440 ‐373 ‐1351 ‐496 ‐5793 ‐51621 ‐1191 ‐14111 ‐1220
San_Jose ‐5444 ‐273 ‐989 ‐363 ‐4239 ‐37769 ‐871 ‐10324 ‐892
San_Juan_Capistrano ‐206 ‐10 ‐37 ‐14 ‐160 ‐1427 ‐33 ‐390 ‐34
San_Luis_Obispo ‐269 ‐13 ‐49 ‐18 ‐209 ‐1864 ‐43 ‐510 ‐44
Santa_Ana ‐2055 ‐103 ‐373 ‐137 ‐1600 ‐14261 ‐329 ‐3898 ‐337
Santa_Barbra ‐545 ‐27 ‐99 ‐36 ‐424 ‐3781 ‐87 ‐1034 ‐89
Santa_Clarita ‐919 ‐46 ‐167 ‐61 ‐716 ‐6377 ‐147 ‐1743 ‐151
Seattle ‐343 ‐17 ‐62 ‐23 ‐267 ‐2377 ‐55 ‐650 ‐56
SFO_Airport ‐4724 ‐237 ‐858 ‐315 ‐3678 ‐32774 ‐756 ‐8959 ‐774
Solana_Beach ‐79 ‐4 ‐14 ‐5 ‐61 ‐548 ‐13 ‐150 ‐13
Sparks ‐142 ‐7 ‐26 ‐9 ‐111 ‐987 ‐23 ‐270 ‐23
Spokane ‐94 ‐5 ‐17 ‐6 ‐73 ‐651 ‐15 ‐178 ‐15
Stockton ‐1482 ‐74 ‐269 ‐99 ‐1154 ‐10286 ‐237 ‐2812 ‐243
Suisun‐Fairfield ‐159 ‐8 ‐29 ‐11 ‐124 ‐1102 ‐25 ‐301 ‐26
Sylmar ‐36 ‐2 ‐7 ‐2 ‐28 ‐251 ‐6 ‐69 ‐6
Tacoma ‐68 ‐3 ‐12 ‐5 ‐53 ‐469 ‐11 ‐128 ‐11
Tahoe ‐54 ‐3 ‐10 ‐4 ‐42 ‐372 ‐9 ‐102 ‐9
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